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Current Issues of E.U. Competition
Law: The New Competition
Enforcement Regime

Philip Lowe*
On May 1, 2004, two major reforms of the EC competition
enforcement regime are expected to enter into force: the modernization of
antitrust enforcement, based on Regulation 1/2003,1 and the review of the
European merger control system. In this contribution, I will outline -he
main principles underlying these reforms. In Part I, I will focus on 'he
instruments the Commission intends to adopt early in 2004 in order to
guarantee the efficient functioning of Regulation 1/2003, the so-called
modernization package. Subsequently, in Part II, I will present the guiding
principles of the future merger control in Europe, as they result from the
modifications to the current merger control regulation that the Council
agreed upon in November 2003. In addition to these two major reforms, +he
Commission also is reviewing the Technology Transfer Block Exemption
Regulation. In Part III, I will describe the main features of that draft
regulation that is also supposed to enter into force on May 1, 2004.
I.

IMPLEMENTATION OF REGULATION

1/2003

On December 16, 2002, the Council adopted Regulation 1/2003, which
establishes a new European competition enforcement regime based on the
joint enforcement of the EC competition rules by the Commission and
national authorities. In order for this new enforcement regime to function
efficiently from May 1, 2004, the Commission decided to complement
Regulation 1/2003 with a package of six accompanying notices and a
Commission implementing regulation, the so-called "Modernization
Package." Before going into any details on these notices, which at -he
Philip Lowe is Director General of DG Competition at the European Commission.
Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2003 on the implementation of the
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1,
*

available

at

http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l001/10012003010 4en

00010025.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Council Regulation 1/2003].
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moment of writing are still in a draft phase, I would like to present an
overview of some of the basic features of Regulation 1/2003.
A. The New Enforcement System
When the Commission launched in 1999 its White Paper on the
modernization of the enforcement of the EC competition rules, it had as a
major objective to maintain and, where possible, to improve the
effectiveness of the enforcement of the EC competition rules in an enlarged
European Union. During numerous debates that representatives of the
Commission subsequently had with the academic, legal and business
community in Europe as well as with the other institutions of the European
Union, it was clear that this objective and the methods suggested to achieve
this objective were widely shared. Of course, I do not ignore that the
precise modalities of the Commission's proposal to modernize the
enforcement of EC competition rules were heavily debated-the reverse
would rather have been a surprise. However, what I above all retained from
these debates was the common desire to construct a new enforcement
system that could guarantee a continued effective application of Articles 81
and 82 of the EC Treaty after the enlargement of the European Union.
I believe that the outcome of those discussions, Council Regulation
1/2003, is an excellent tool to guarantee such an effective competition
policy, and will contribute to promoting the single market in a union of
twenty-five Member States and more. There are several reasons why I
believe this is the case.
First, the notification system has been abolished. The abolition of the
notification system means that the Commission can re-focus its
enforcement work, not in order to do less but in order to do more
meaningful work in the interest of consumers. The Commission will thus
be able to intervene more proactively in order to protect competition in
Europe.
Second, no longer will the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 of the
EC Treaty be the defacto sole responsibility of the Commission, since these
two articles become directly applicable in their entirety by Member States,
including Article 81(3). The direct applicability of Article 81(3) of the EC
Treaty implies more potential for the application of the EC competition
rules by Member States' courts and competition authorities. Proceedings
by national competition authorities and national courts can thus no longer
be blocked or delayed by notifications to the Commission. This means that
Article 81 of the EC Treaty will be applied in the same way as the other
Treaty provisions that are directly applicable to Member States.
Third, the competition rules of the EC Treaty will become the common
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competition rules for the whole European Union.2 Where a case falls inside
the scope of application of Articles 81 and 82, Member States' courts and
competition authorities will not be able to leave aside the EC competition
rules and base their decisions solely on national law. Under Article 3 of the
Regulation 1/2003, they have an obligation to apply the EC competition
rules, at least alongside national law. Of course they may also apply
Articles 81 and 82 on a stand-alone basis.
Finally, the joint enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty
will lead to an increased effectiveness of the enforcement of competition
rules, if all enforcers apply the rules in a coherent way. Regulation 1/2003
provides for mechanisms of co-ordination and co-operation between the
Commission and the national authorities to achieve such coherent
enforcement.3
1.

The ModernizationPackage

The modernization package constitutes the central part of the
Commission's implementation of Regulation 1/2003. It consists of six
notices and a Commission implementing regulation,4 which mainly
addresses the handling of complaints, the modalities for the hearing of the
parties concerned, complainants and third parties, as well as the access to
file and the treatment of confidential information. In October 2003, the
drafts of these texts were published for public consultation 5 and at the
moment of writing, we are still analyzing the comments received. Early
next year, the Commission will adopt the final package, which will be ready
for application on May 1, 2004.
Below, I will highlight the main elements of the six draft notices in the
following paragraphs. There are two notices on points of substance (the
notice on the effect on trade concept and the notice on the application of
Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty), two notices on relations with certain
2See id. at art 3.
3 See id. at ch. IV.
4 Draft Commission Regulation on proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles
81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, 2003 O.J. (C 243) 3; Draft Commission Notice on cooperation
within the Network of Competition Authorities, 2003 O.J. (C 243) 11; Draft Commission
Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States
in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, 2003 O.J. (C 243) 20; Draft Commission Notice
on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty,
2003 O.J. (C 243) 30; Draft Commission Notice on informal guidance relating to novel
questions concerning Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty that arise in individual cases
(guidance letters), 2003 O.J. (C 243) 42; Draft Commission Notice Guidelines on the effect
on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (C 243) 45
[hereinafter Draft Guidelines]; Draft Notice - Communication from the Commission
Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (C 243) 62.
5 Id.
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stakeholders (the notice on guidance letters and the notice on the handling
of complaints), and finally, two notices on the co-operation with the other
enforcers: the national competition authorities and the national courts.
a) The Guidelines on the Effect on Trade Concept
The effect on trade concept is the jurisdictional criterion that
determines the scope of application of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.
This has always been the case, so why now a Commission Notice? The
answer lies in the enhanced interest for guidance on this concept as Member
States' courts and competition authorities will apply Articles 81 and 82
more often. The question whether a case tests red or blue in terms of effect
on trade is decisive to concluding whether it is inside or outside Articles 81
and 82, inside or outside Regulation 1/2003, and, in particular, inside or
outside Article 3 of that Regulation.
Against this backdrop, the Commission has agreed to produce a notice
on the effect on trade concept. We have, however, made clear from the
very beginning that there can be no question of attempting to modify the
scope of application of Community law in one way or another. The notice
describes and explains the current case law, presenting it in a systematic
framework.
We propose a new rule concerning the notion of appreciable effect on
trade, the so-called "NAAT-rule" (Not Appreciably Affecting Trade). This
NAAT-rule contains two cumulative thresholds: one is a 5% market share
threshold, and the other is a turnover threshold of C 40 million, calculated
on the basis of the products covered by the agreement.6 For agreements or
practices by parties that fall below both thresholds, there would be a
refutable presumption that trade between Member States is in principle not
capable of being appreciably affected.
This NAAT-rule is specific to the jurisdictional criterion of effect on
trade and distinct from the policy orientations in the Commission Notice on
agreements of minor importance, which do not appreciably restrict
competition (the "de minimis notice"). The latter only concerns the
question of whether there is no appreciable restrictionof competition.
b) The Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty
Decentralized application of Article 81(3) is one of the main elements
of the new system, and there is, in our view, a need for the Commission to
explain what the methodology is for applying this exception rule. For
instance, it is very important that we explain the types of efficiency that
may be created by restrictive agreements and the conditions for finding that
consumers receive a fair share of these benefits. The draft notice goes over
6 Draft Guidelines, supra note 4, at 50-5 1, at para. 52.
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all the conditions of application of the provision, explaining the legal
notions and providing indications on underlying economic concepts.
The notice on Article 81(3) does not replace, but rather complements
the more detailed Commission guidelines on specific types of agreements,
and, in particular, the guidelines on vertical restraints and the guidelines on
horizontal co-operation agreements. 7 Thus, the notice on Article 81(3)
forms the general chapter in the guidance book that the Commission has put
together for the past several years.
c) The Notice on the Handling of Complaints
In the new enforcement system, market information from businesses
and consumers will become important to the Commission. We would like
to encourage consumers and businesses to come forward and inform us
about suspected infringements of the competition rules. We will create a
new electronic address and invite consumers and businesses to provide
information on suspected infringements in any form they find appropriate.
However, not everybody has a fully developed complaint to make.
Market information from several sources has to be collected before it
combines to a picture that allows us often to start looking into a case ex
officio. In order to improve the quality of complaints from the outset and
allow the Commission to focus on the complaints that merit priority
treatment, the draft Commission implementing regulation proposes to
introduce a requirement for complaints. These complaints will be adjudged
against a "checklist" that sets out certain types of information that should be
provided. As soon as this minimum amount of information has been
provided, the Commission undertakes in the notice on complaints to inform
complainants within an indicative time period of four months whether it
intends to pursue the complaint in view of a full investigation of the case.
d) The Notice on Guidance Letters
When the Commission first made the proposal to abolish the
notification system, some feared that it would lead to a reduction in legal
certainty. We have taken this concern seriously, which is one of the reasons
why it is of paramount importance to us to have the modernization package
ready before the date of application of Regulation 1/2003.
I realize that general guidance via block exemption regulations and
notices may not be capable of solving all problems of unpredictability.
Conversely, the Commission cannot be obliged to issue guidance upon
simple request, because that would just be a different name for the current
7Commission Notice Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2000 O.J. (C 291) 1;
Commission Notice Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to
horizontal cooperation agreements, 2001 O.J. (C 3) 2.
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notification system.
In the notice on guidance letters, the Commission explains the criteria
by which it will be led in its decision whether or not to provide written
guidance. The most important one is the existence of a genuine unresolved
issue concerning the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.
We propose to take account of additional factors, such as the economic
importance from the perspective of consumers of the products concerned
and the importance of the agreement or practice in terms of its prevalence.
We also propose to take into account the level of investment made or
envisaged by the parties and the extent to which the transaction involves a
structural operation.
In my view, these factors strike a good balance between the public
interest in the Commission using its resources to promote the general good
and the private interest of the parties in obtaining guidance in their
particular case.
e) The Notice on Co-operation with National Courts
Under Regulation 1/2003, national courts will play an enhanced role in
the enforcement of EC competition rules. 8 The draft notice is intended to
serve as a practical tool for national judges who apply Articles 81 and 82 in
conformity with Regulation 1/2003. With that objective in mind, the draft
notice addresses two topics.
First, the draft notice gives general explanations about the procedural
context in which national judges are operating when applying Articles 81
and 82. The notice underlines that alongside the national procedural law,
judges also have to take into account procedural rules emanating from
Regulation 1/2003 or from the general principles of Community law. The
Notice assembles relevant case law of the Community courts on this latter
point. Particular attention is also given to the situation in which a national
court deals with a case in parallel with or subsequent to the Commission,
thereby recalling the principles outlined by the Court of Justice in the
Masterfoods case 9 and by the Council in Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003.'°
Second, the draft notice focuses on the co-operation instruments of
Regulation 1/2003. Indeed, Regulation 1/2003 for the first time establishes
a firm legal basis for national judges to ask the Commission for an opinion
or for information it holds. In addition, the regulation also created the
possibility for the Commission and for the national competition authorities
to submit written and oral observations to the national courts in the interest
of coherent application of the EC competition rules. The notice spells out
8 Council Regulation 1/2003, supra note 1, at art. 6.
9 C-344/98, Masterfoods Ltd. v. HB Ice Cream Ltd., 2000 E.C.R.
10Council Regulation 1/2003, supra note 1, at art. 16(1).

1-11369.
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how the Commission intends to put these co-operation mechanisms in
practice. Since the aim of the amicus instrument is to promote consistent
application of Articles 81 and 82, the Commission only intends to use this
instrument where there is a real issue of coherent application. Its briefs will
thus be strictly limited to the aspects of the case that raise an important
issue of consistency. It is of course up to the courts to involve the partiesas appropriate in the respective procedural framework-and to take into
account the submission of the Commission in its decision as it sees fit.
The Commission will also not seek any contacts with the parties to a
litigation in respect of which it has been asked for an opinion or considers
submitting an amicus brief. Both types of interaction are a matter between
the national court and the Commission. They are intended to allow the
Commission-in the public interest-to draw the court's attention to
important issues relating to the application of Articles 81 and 82, no more,
no less.
f) The Notice on the Co-operation Within the Network of Competition
Authorities
The Network Notice explains the main pillars of the co-operation
between the competition authorities inside the European Competition
Network ("ECN"). The notice develops principles for allocating work
between the members of the network. In this context, it is useful to recall
that Regulation 1/2003 creates a system of parallel competences for all
network members to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. That
implies that the case allocation criteria as they are formulated in the draft
notice on the co-operation within the ECN cannot be qualified as rules for
the allocation of competence. The case allocation criteria are merely
indicative criteria for the division of work between the network members.
The criteria can be roughly summarized as follows: cases should be
dealt with by an authority that is well placed to restore competition on the
market. It follows that a single national competition authority is usually
well placed to deal with agreements or practices that substantially affect
competition mainly within its territory. Single action of a national
competition authority may also be appropriate regarding infringements of
wider scope where the action of a single national competition authority is
sufficient to bring the entire infringement to an end.
Where an agreement or practice has substantial effects on competition
in several territories and the action of only one authority would not be
sufficient to bring the entire infringement to an end or to sanction it
adequately, parallel action by two or three Member State competition
authorities may be appropriate in order to ensure effective deterrence and to
avoid under-punishment. Of course, such parallel action should involve
close coordination between the authorities concerned in order to avoid any
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inconsistent outcome.
Where an infringement has effects in more than three Member States,
the Commission will often be considered to be best placed to deal with a
case.
These indications concerning case allocation are primarily designed so
as to guide complainants, leniency applicants and competition authorities,
thus ensuring that the vast majority of cases are dealt with by a well-placed
authority from the very beginning. Other authorities, equally competent
and possibly also well placed, would in those circumstances abstain from
acting. The situation where one authority starts a case that is then further
pursued by another (a situation often referred to as "re-allocation") should
therefore be very rare.
These orientations are of course without prejudice to the responsibility
of the Commission to take up cases that are potential precedents in order to
set policy for the internal market. The purpose is to ensure coherence or to
compensate for a lack of enforcement in parts of the Community where that
is really necessary because serious infringements would otherwise persist or
remain unsanctioned.
B. Review of the Merger Control Regulation
The Merger Control Regulation ("Merger Regulation"), the first
Europe-wide merger control law, has now been in force for more than
thirteen years. This innovative piece of legislation granted the Commission
the exclusive jurisdiction to examine large, cross-border mergers in Europe
so as to assess their likely impact on competition. It has served to facilitate
corporate restructuring in Europe by ensuring regulatory clearance within a
timetable that corresponds to the needs of business.
In December 2002, the Commission adopted a blueprint for the most
far-reaching reform of European merger control since the European Council
of Ministers finally adopted the Merger Regulation in December 1989.11
This reform was the outcome of a review program which was initiated in
2000, culminating in the adoption of a Green Paper by the Commission in
December of 2001.2 Central to the reform was a new draft Regulation. On
November 27, 2003, the Council of Ministers reached unanimous political
agreement on a new Regulation, which will shortly be formally adopted by
the Council, and which will become applicable on May 1, 2004, in time for
the enlargement of the European Union. Ten new Member States will join
the European Union on the same day.
" Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the control of concentrations
between undertakings, 2003 O.J. (C 20) 4.
12Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, COM(01)745
final at 6, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/gpr/2001/com2001_0745en01 .pdf
(last visited Mar. 5, 2004)
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1. The Commission's Record in Merger Control. Time for Reform

The E.U. merger control regime has facilitated industrial restructuring
in Europe. It has provided a "one stop shop" for the scrutiny of large crossborder mergers, dispensing with the need for companies to file in a
multiplicity of national jurisdictions in the European Union; it has
guaranteed that merger investigations will be completed within tight
deadlines; a remarkable degree of transparency has been maintained in the
rendering of decisions - each and every merger notified to the Commission
results in the communication and publication of a reasoned decision.
The Merger Regulation has served Europe well. However, like all
other systems, it is in need of constant revision to ensure that it is fitted to
grapple with the evolving challenges which it faces. Over the past thirteen
years, the Commission has reviewed more than 2,000 mergers and
acquisitions, some 90% of which were cleared unconditionally following a
one-month review. Since 1990, the Commission has prohibited only
eighteen deals, less than 1% the total notified. But the system put in place
in 1990 has been showing some signs of strain. Merger activity has
increased beyond most expectations since the introduction of the Merger
Regulation. The number of concentrations notified to the Commission
increased spectacularly during the 1990's, to the point where the
Commission now annually reviews more than five times as many cases as
in the early years.
Higher levels of industrial concentration have
necessitated greater sophistication in the economic analysis contained in the
Commission's reasoned decisions in the field of merger control, and those
decisions have been subject to increasingly close scrutiny by the European
courts.

The three judgments delivered last year by the European Court of First13
Instance ("CFI") on the bid by Airtours (now MyTravel) for First Choice,
and its more recent rulings on the French electrical equipment merger
between Schneider and Legrand' 4 and on the Tetra Laval/Sidel
transaction, 5 raised important issues concerning the functioning of the E.U.
merger review process. In particular, it is clear that the CFI is now holding
the Commission to a high standard of proof, which has important
implications for the way in which the Commission conducts its
investigations.
Reform must not, however, undermine the very real merits inherent in
the current system. What the Commission has proposed, therefore, are
significant improvements to the current system, transforming what is
already a very good system into an even better one. In a nutshell, the key
13Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585.

14Case T-77/02, Schneider Elec. v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4201.
15Case T-80/02, Tetra Laval v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4519.
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rationale underlying the reform is two-fold. First, it is designed to enhance
the transparency and consistency of the Commission's policy with regard to
merger control analysis. Second, it seeks to improve the Commission's
decision-making process, making sure that merger investigations are more
thorough, more focused, and more firmly grounded in sound economic
reasoning. At the same time, investigations must always be conducted with
regard to the rights of the merging parties as well as of third parties.
2. The Reform Package
The reform package in the field of EC merger control consists of a
number of elements, including, first and foremost, a proposal for a new
Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings
(the new EC Merger Regulation). 16 The proposal has now been adopted by
the EC Council of Ministers, and is described in greater detail below.
Draft Commission guidelines on the assessment of "horizontal"
mergers are also a crucial element of the package.' 7 These guidelines
comprehensively articulate the Commission's approach to the assessment of
such merger transactions when determining their likely impact on
competition. The draft has been the subject of wide public consultation of
both Member States and interested third parties during the course of 2003,
and the final version will shortly be adopted.
Draft best practices on the conduct of merger investigations have also
been published, which have likewise been the subject of wide public
consultation of interested parties, notably the legal and business
community, during the course of 2003. A final version will shortly be
published on the Commission's Directorate-General ("DG") Competition
website. The draft best practices cover the day-to-day handling of merger
cases by DG Competition, and the Commission's relationship with the
merging parties and interested third parties, and in particular concerning the
timing of meetings, transparency, and due process in merger proceedings.
In addition to these elements, a number of other measures relating to
the staffing and internal organization of the Commission's DG for
Competition have been decided upon. They include:
- reorganizing antitrust and merger staff on sectoral lines to allow for
16Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations

between undertakings, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1, available at http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/l_024/l_02420040129en00010022.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2004)
[hereinafter Regulation 139/2004].
17Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on
the control of concentrations between undertakings, 2004 O.J. (C 31) 5, available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/c_031/c03120040205en00050018.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Assessment Guidelines].
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-

-

better focus on market development and more flexible use of
resources among cases;
the establishment of a peer review mechanism for major cases, with
a systematic appointment of a "fresh pair of eyes" team to take
stock of each case; and finally,
the creation of a new position of Chief Competition Economist in
the Directorate General, and the appointment of its first incumbent,
Lars-Hendrick R611er, an industrial economist of international
reputation.
3. The New Merger Regulation

On November 27, 2003, the Council reached political agreement on a
recast Merger Regulation substantially incorporating the reforms proposed
by the Commission in December 2002. These reforms relate to the
substantive test in Art. 2, to procedural issues such as the timing of
notifications, investigation time limits, the Commission's decision-making
powers, and to the question of case-allocation among jurisdictions within
the European Union.
a) The Substantive Test
One of the central aims of the proposed reform was to ensure that the
substantive test in the Merger Regulation could cover effectively all anticompetitive mergers while at the same time ensuring continued legal
certainty. The Commission had launched via its Green Paper a reflection
on the effectiveness of the substantive test in Article 2 of the Merger
Regulation (the "dominance test") and in particular on how this test
compares with the "substantial lessening of competition" ("SLC") test used
in several other jurisdictions. Among the main arguments in favor of a
change to SLC were that such a test would be inherently better-suited to
dealing with the full range and complexity of competition problems that
mergers can give rise to, and in particular that there may be a gap or gaps in
the scope of the current test. Indeed, it emerged from our review last year
that there were particular concerns that the Regulation might not be able to
tackle all situations of oligopoly in markets for differentiated products,
when the merger would involve the elimination of a significant competitive
constraint. However, it would neither result in the creation or strengthening
of the paramount firm in the market, nor in a likelihood of coordination
between the oligopolists. Conversely, however, it was felt that adopting an
altogether new test might jeopardize the preservation of the precedent built
up under the Regulation, including the jurisprudence developed by the
Courts over the years, thereby reducing legal certainty. As a result, the
Commission proposed that the scope of the test should be clarified.
The text of the new test adopted by the Council states that "a
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concentration which would significantly impede effective competition, in
the common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of
the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared
incompatible with the common market."' 8 This new test achieves the
Commission's original aims. Legal certainty is enhanced through the
closing of any perceived gap in the previous test, while at the same time
past precedent, including the caselaw of the European courts, is retained. It
should moreover be stressed that the new test will be applied on the basis of
a sound economic framework of assessment as set out in the Guidelines on
Horizontal Mergers (soon to be adopted).1 9 The Commission also intends
to adopt further Guidelines on Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers.
b) Procedural and Jurisdictional Issues
The new Regulation provides for a number of changes which are
aimed at increasing the flexibility of the system while retaining the
principle of ex-ante control with clear, legally-binding deadlines. A system
of mandatory notification with suspensive effect is retained, but greater
flexibility is introduced into the requirements for timing of notifications and
the definition of the triggering event has been modified.2 °
c) Time Limits for Investigation
In regards to the time limits for investigation, the new Regulation
makes a number of significant amendments to the existing provisions.
First, the old deadlines have now all been converted into "Working Days"
deadlines, with some consequent minor alterations in the time periods.2'
For example, the previous Phase I deadline of one month will, starting on
May 1, 2004, become twenty-five working days. Second, the six-week
deadline in Phase I applicable to cases where commitments have been
offered or where a request for referral has been received, has become thirtyfive working days. 22 Third, for the deadlines in Phase II, the new
Regulation provides for a fifteen-working-day automatic extension of the
deadline to 105 working days where remedies have been offered by the
parties. 2' The objective of this provision is to allow for greater consultation
of third parties and Member States. However, this extension will not apply
if remedies are offered at an early stage in the procedure, i.e. less than fifty-

18Regulation 139/2004, supra note 16, at art. 2(3).
19 Assessment Guidelines, supra note 17.
20 Regulation 139/2004, supra note 16, at art. 4(1).
21 Id. at art. 10.
22 Id. at art. 10(1).
23 Id. at art. 10(3).
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five working days into the Phase I procedure.24 Fourth, there is provision
for a twenty working day extension of the Phase II deadline in complex
Phase II cases.
Such an extension will, however, only be made at the
parties' request or with their consent.
d) Timing of Notifications
The new Regulation also provides for more flexibility in regards to the
timing of notifications to the Commission. Under the new legislation, it
will be possible to notify a transaction prior to the conclusion of a binding
agreement 2 provided that there is a good faith intent to enter into an
agreement.. The current deadline for notification of one week from the
conclusion of the agreement is also removed, provided that no steps are
27
taken towards implementation.
These more flexible rules should allow
companies to better organize their transactions without having to fit their
planning around unnecessarily rigid rules, and should facilitate international
cooperation in merger cases, particularly when it comes to synchronizing
the timing of investigations by different agencies.
e) Enhanced Fact-Finding Powers
With regard to the Merger Regulation's fact-finding provisions, the
new Regulation provides, with some exceptions, for the alignment of its
fact-finding powers, including the fining provisions, with those provided in
the new implementing Regulation for Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.
In particular the new Regulation provides for an increase in the maximum
level of fines to be applied in the case of incorrect or misleading
information being provided,28 as well as an increase in the level of periodic
penalties applicable in the case of failure to comply with requests for
information. 9 This should enable the Commission to obtain information
more easily and thus to improve the efficiency and efficacy of its
investigations.
f) Jurisdictional Issues: Simpler and More Flexible Allocation of Cases
One of the main objectives of the reforms proposed by the
Commission was to optimize the allocation of cases between the
Commission and national competition authorities in light of the principle of
subsidiarity, while at same time tackling the persistent and increasing

25

Id.
Id.

26

Id. at art. 4(1).

24

27 Id.
28
29

Id. at art. 14(1).
Id. at art. 15(1).
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incidence of "multiple filings" (notifications having to be made to several
competition authorities within the European Union). The new Regulation
provides, first, for a streamlining of the referral system, including a
simplification of the criteria for such referral,30 and second, it introduces the
possibility for notifying parties to request referrals at the pre-notification
stage. 31 The changes are designed to ensure that, in line with the principle
of subsidiarity, the case is dealt with by the authority best placed to deal
with it, while at the same time keeping to a minimum the number of cases
requiring multiple filing.
C. Review of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation
This review process started in December 2001, when the Commission
adopted a mid-term review Report on the application of the Technology
Transfer Block Exemption Regulation ("TTBE").32 We took this as an
opportunity to start a thorough review of our policy towards intellectual
property licensing agreements.
Technology transfer activities have considerably evolved during recent
years. It seems that more joint efforts and more complex licensing
arrangements are now required to keep pace with the greater complexity of
new technologies but also to overcome the problems of "patent thickets."
And as licensing activities are often global it is good to discuss the issues
not just with interested parties from Europe but also from the United States.
However, there are other reasons underlying this review. In particular
the TTBE is rather formalistic and legalistic and not in line with the more
economic approach adopted under the new rules on distribution and
horizontal co-operation agreements. The 2001 Report highlighted the need
to adapt the TTBE to ensure more consistency with the new generation of
Commission block exemptions concerning distribution, research and
development, and specialization agreements which are based on a more
economic approach.
In 2002, stakeholders were consulted on the review report. After that,
the details were worked out for a new block exemption regulation and a set
of guidelines. The draft texts for the new block exemption regulation and
guidelines were adopted by the Commission for consultation purposes just
before the summer break of 2003. They were discussed with Member
States in September 2003 and were published on October 1, 2003, for
consultation of industry and consumer organizations and other interested
third parties during the months of October and November 2003. At the
30 Id. at arts. 4(4-5), 9(2a), 22(1).
31 Id. at art. 4(4-5).

32Commission Regulation (EC) No. 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of technology transfer agreements, 1996 O.J.
(L 31) 2.
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time of writing, this consultation period was just ending.
1. Findingthe Right Balance
The old view was that Intellectual property rights ("IPRs") created
monopolies while competition policy sought to eliminate monopolies.
However, as already stated in the Report, we do not perceive competition
policy and innovation policy as being at odds with each other. Both have a
complementary role and aim to promote innovation to the benefit of
consumers. Contrary to what some might think, competition is a necessary
stimulus for innovation.
In many cases, having an IPR will not automatically imply having
market power as sufficient competing technologies may exist. Licensing,
also when it contains restrictions on licensee or licensor, will therefore
often be pro-competitive as it allows the integration of complementary
assets, allows for more rapid entry, helps disseminating the technology and
provides a reward for what was usually a risky investment. However,
licensing agreements and restrictions therein may also sometimes be used to
restrict competition, in particular in those cases where the IPR does provide
the company with market power. It is therefore important in such cases to
protect competition.
Increasingly, it is being recognized that patents and the patent system
may not always stimulate innovation but may be used to retard innovation. In
addition to protecting the returns of innovation for which they are intended,
there is evidence of an increasing use of patents to block products of
competitors, as bargaining chips in cross licensing negotiations and to prevent
or defend against infringement suits. The latter uses of patents are a zero-sum
or negative-sum game. Competition policy can not prevent "patent thickets"
from coming into existence. However, competition policy can help companies
in their efforts to overcome these problems by allowing pro-competitive cross
licensing, patent pools and patent settlements, while preventing that such
licensing and settlements are used to obtain anti-competitive outcomes.
In other words, competition policy should not be used as an instrument to
systematically revise the balance struck by IP laws and impinge on the
awarded property rights. However, competition policy should be applied to
the ways IPRs are exploited and deal with licensing agreements as it does with
other distribution and cooperation agreements between competitors and noncompetitors.
2. Main Featuresof the DraftNew Regulation
As at the time of writing, we were near the end of the consultation
period so I cannot say much on the details of the new rules. However it is
our belief that the new rules will be firmly aligned on the new generation of
block exemption regulations and guidelines for distribution agreements and
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horizontal co-operation agreements. This was requested by many of those
who commented on our Evaluation Report and will have the following
advantages:
1) The block exemption regulation will only have a black list. By
doing away with the white and grey lists of the current regulation,
the strait jacket is avoided and the scope of the regulation is
extended: whatever is not explicitly excluded from the block
exemption is now covered.
2) The scope of the new rules will also be extended by covering all
types of technology transfer agreements for the production of goods
or services. The new regulation is, for instance, proposed to cover
not only patent and know-how licensing but also software copyright
licensing, as requested by many of those who commented on our
Evaluation Report.
3) The new rules will make a clear distinction between licensing
between competitors and licensing between non-competitors. For
obvious reasons competition policy should distinguish between
licensing between competitors and between non-competitors as the
treatment and in particular the applicable hardcore list should differ.
Competition problems are more likely to arise in licensing between
competitors than in licensing between non-competitors.
4) The safe harbor created by the block exemption will be limited by
market share thresholds, different for licensing between competitors
and for licensing between non-competitors. The required market
share calculation, both for the technology and product market, is
proposed to be kept straightforward by only having to look at the
presence of the licensed technology on the product market. In other
words, market shares are always calculated in terms of sales of the
licensed products.
5) The new block exemption regulation will have a clear and short
hardcore list similar to the list found in the other block exemption
regulations. An agreement containing a hardcore restriction can not
benefit from the block exemption and is also, in the context of an
individual assessment, unlikely to fulfill the conditions of Article
81(3).
3. Comparing the European Union with the United States
This brings me to the comparison of the proposed new rules with the
United States policy. Having a block exemption regulation provides a level
of legal certainty which companies do not have in the United States, where
there are only guidelines. Once covered by the block exemption, the
Commission and national authorities can only take this protection away for
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the future and not with retro-active effect.
In general, the new rules will bring about an important degree of
convergence between E.U. and U.S. policy towards licensing agreements,
especially where it concerns licensing agreements between competitors: a
similar hardcore list, a similar safe harbor defined by a market share
threshold and a similar framework for the rule of reason analysis to be
applied outside the safe harbor.
Where it concerns licensing agreements between non-competitors the
policy will also be similar to the one in the United States where it concerns
restraints which affect inter-brand or inter-technology competition, such as
tying and exclusive dealing/non-compete contracts.
For good legal, economic and political reasons the new rules will
however keep some more distance to the United States where it concerns
intra-technology restraints in licensing agreements between noncompetitors. This concerns in particular sales restrictions that can be used
to carve up the market without proper efficiency argument. The reasons for
this continued divergence with the United States are threefold:
- First, territorial restrictions are paid more attention to because of the
additional market integration objective which EC competition policy has.
- Second, it reflects the higher importance EC competition policy
attaches to intra-brand and intra-technology competition in general. It is
considered important to protect intra-brand competition as a useful and
sometimes essential complement to inter-brand competition. It is also
recognition of the fact that restraints are almost never only affecting intrabrand competition but may also facilitate collusion, especially in cases of
cumulative use.
- Third, sales restrictions may be used to prevent arbitrage and support
price discrimination between different markets. This will in general lead to
a loss of consumer welfare. While some consumers will pay a higher price
and others will pay a lower price, collectively consumers will have to pay
more to finance the extra profits obtained by the supplier and to cover the
extra costs of supporting the price discrimination scheme. Therefore
consumer welfare will in general decline unless it can be clearly shown that
otherwise the lower priced market(s) would not be served at all and that
therefore the price discrimination will lead to an undisputable increase of
output. It's only in the latter case that consumer welfare may actually
increase.
D. Conclusion
Regulation 1/2003 and the modernization package, the review merger
control Regulation and the reviewed TTBE regulation are reforms which
aim at improving the effectiveness of our competition policy and at
enhancing its real impact in opening and maintaining competitive markets.
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This is a goal that we must achieve to ensure that the European Union is
able to cope with two major and immediate challenges, namely to guarantee
that business and authorities are able to operate under the same competition
policy constraints in the enlarged European Union and to make European
markets more open and competitive in order to foster sustainable growth.

